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of these variables on equity REIT returns is around 60% of the impacts on corporate stock returns generally.
As expected, the impacts are greater for more heavily levered REITs than for less levered REITs. Real estate, at
least as measured by the return performance of equity REITs, is less risky than stocks generally, but does not
offer a superior risk-adjusted return and is not a hedge against unexpected inflation.
Disciplines
Business | Economics | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/3
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RISK AND RETURN ON REAL ESTATE: EVIDENCE FROM EQUITY REITs
K.C. Chan
Patric H. Hendershott
Anthony B. Sanders
Working Paper No. 3311
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
March 1990
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at seminars at the Universities
of Arizona, Florida, Georgia Tech, Ohio State, and Southern California and at
the 1989 Annual Meetings of the American Finance and American Real Estate and
Urban Economics Associations. We thank participants at these forums for their
suggestions and Chris Lucas, Research Director of the National Association of
Real Estate Investment Trusts, for his assistance in identifying both the REITs
to include in our sample and their degree of leverage. This paper is part of
NBER's research program in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any
opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER Working Paper #3311
March 1990
RISK AND RETURN ON REAL ESTATE: EVIDENCE FROM EQUITY REITs
ABSTRACT
We analyze monthly returns on an equally-weighted index of 18 to 23 equity
(real property) real estate investment trusts (REITs) that were traded on major
stock exchanges over the 1973-87 period. We employ a multifactor Arbitrage
Pricing Model using prespecified macroeconomic factors. We also test whether
equity REIT returns are related to changes in the discount on closed-end stock
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Three factors, and the percentage change in the discount on closed-end
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changes in the risk and term structures of interest rates. The impacts of
these variables on equity REIT returns is around 60 percent of the impacts on
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Early research on real estate returns concluded, somewhat tentatively,
that real estate both earned substantial risk-adjusted excess returns and
served as a good hedge against inflation [Brueggeman, Chen and Thibodeau
(1984), Ibbotson and Siegel (1984) and Hartzell, Heckman and Miles (1987)1.
Unfortunately, these studies employed return data based on market appraisals,
rather than actual transaction prices. Such data are now widely recognized as
being smoothed, which understates the true volatility of real estate returns
and overstates the risk-adjusted returns (Firstenberg, Ross and Zisler, 1988,
and Geltner, l989).l
Rather than focus on appraisal-based returns, we analyze monthly returns
on equity (real property) real estate investment trusts (REITs) that are traded
on major stock exchanges. While our series might overstate the volatility of
real estate returns owing to the closed-end nature of the REITs (Firstenberg,
Ross and Zisler, 1988), these returns are certainly more representative of
transaction prices than those based on appraised values. In assessing the
relative riskiness of real estate returns, we employ a multifactor Arbitrage
Pricing Model as well as the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Because we wish to
uncover how various macroeconomic factors, including inflation, affect real
estate returns, we use the factors prespecified in Chen, Roll and Ross (1986),
rather than the factor analytic approach of Titman and Warga (1987). Because
we are interested in the relative riskiness of real estate, we explain equally-
weighted market indexes for both equity REITs and NYSE firms.
2Our results illustrate the importance of using a multifactor model. When
a simple CAPM framework is employed, we find evidence of excess real estate
returns, especially in the 1980s. However, when the multifactor model is
employed, this evidence evaporates. Three factors consistently drive both real
estate and stock market returns: changes in the risk and term structures and
unexpected inflation. Because unexpected inflation has a negative impact, real
estate is not a hedge againstunexpected inflation. The impact of changes in
expected inflation is not stable over time, tending to be negative in the l97Oa
and positive in the 1980s, while the impact of forward changes in industrial
production is positive but estimated imprecisely. Except for the latter
variable, the impacts of the macro factors on real estate returns are
consistently around 60 percent of the impacts on corporate atock returna
generally.
We also explore the possibility that the same forces driving discounts on
closed-end stock funds affect returns on equity REITa. Because equity REITs
are closed-end mutual funds invested in real-estate assets (largely real
properties), such a relationship seems plausible and is, in fact, uncovered in
the data. When our equally-weighted equity REIT return index is regressed on
the closed-end stock-fund discount computed by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1989),
a coefficient of 0.5 is obtained with a t-ratio of three, further reinforcing
the result that real estate is less risky than common stocks.
The paper is divided into three sections and a conclusion. Section I
derives the basic estimation equation, Section II discusses the equity REIT
data and their determinants, and Section III reports the empirical results.
I. The Estimation Methodoloey
A useful empirical framework for evaluating REIT risk-adjusted
performance in a multifactor world requires regressing REIT excess returns
on the excess returns of portfolios whose returns mimic (are perfectly
3correlated with) the individual prespecified factors. This approach is
similar to the performance evaluation technique of Connor and Korajczyk
(1986) and Titman and Warga (1988) using factors estimated from stock return
data. The mimicking portfolios we use are those derived by Huberinan, Kandel
and Stambaugh (1986). The model subsection below derives the pricing
relation. The second subsection then explains how these mimicking
portfolios are formed and their returns calculated.
A. The Model
In the Arbitrage Pricing Model of Ross (1976), returns on N assets in
the economy are assumed to be generated by the following factor model:
r—E+Bf+€, (1)
where r is a Nxl vector of returns, E is a Nxl vector of expected returns, f
is a Kxl matrix of random factors with means equal to zero, B is a NxK
matrix of factor sensitivities (loadings), and is an Nxl vector of
residuals. The covariance matrix of r is given by V, and the covariance
matrix of the e is given by Z. If exact pricing condition obtains,2
E_irf+Bu (2)
where rf is the return on a riskless asset if it exists, i is a vector of
ones, and u is a Kxl vector of risk premiums associated with each of the
factors. Thus
r - irf — Bu + Bf + e. (1)
The factors f are not identified by the APT. Following Chen, Roll and
Ross (CRR, 1986) and Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985), we prespecify them to be a
4set of macroeconomic innovations that capture the pervasive forces in the
economy. Regressing the time series of returns in excess of the T-bill rate
on these macroeconomic innovations and a constant can help us determine the
sensitivities, B, but the risk premiums, u, are imbedded in the constant.
Thus, the intercept of the time series regression cannot be interpreted aa a
Jensen performance measure, as in the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We can,
however, obtain a Jensen performance measure if we state the pricing
relation in terms of a set of mimicking portfolios.
Portfolios are known as mimicking portfolios if their payoffs, rather
than the random factors, can be used for pricing the N assets when exact
arbitrage pricing holds. Let ak be a Nxl vector that represents positions
in the N assets that mimic the k-th factor, i.e. , the return on this
portfolio moves one-for-one with movements in the k-th factor and is
unrelated to movements in the other factors. The Kxl vector of payoffs on
the K mimicking positions is given as R — A'r, where A is a NxK matrix whoae
k-th column is aSK. That is, when the expected returns on the N assets can
be stated in terms of return sensitivities to these mimicking portfolios:
E—irf+Cv, (3)
where C — Cov(r,R) — VA and v is a vector of constants.
Huberman, Kandel and Stambaugh (1986) show that there are numerous sets
of mimicking portfolios for a given set of factors. One particular set of
mimicking portfolios that is convenient for our tests is given by
A — V1B(B'VB) — ZB(B'ZB)* (4)
These portfolios have the minimum residual variance of all the possible
mimicking portfolios, subject to the condition that akB — ek where ek is a
Kxl vector with the k-th component equal to one and other components equal
to zero. Note that the returns to the mimicking portfolios, R — Ar, are
equivalent to generalized least squares cross sectional regression
coefficients of the asset returns on the sensitivity coefficients (Grinblatt
and Titnian, 1987).
Two properties of these "unit loading" mimicking portfolios are
noteworthy (the proofs are given in Huberman, Kandel and Stanbaugh). First,
the loadings of all assets with respect to these mimicking portfolios are
equal to B, which are the loadings with respect to the original factors.
r—a+BR+, (5)
where a and , are both Nxl vectors, 'i containing random residuals with mean
zero. Taking the expectation of (5) and substituting this value for E in
equation (2),
a+BR_irf+Bu, (2')
where is the mean return vector for the mimicking portfolios. Second, if
the mimicking portfolios are financed by zero investment, their expected
returns are equal to the risk premiums associated with the factors, i.e.,
— u. Substituting this relation into equation (2'), a — irf and thus
equation (5) becomes
r - irf — BR + ,. (6)
6Thus, we can estimate REIT risk exposures and evaluate risk-adjusted
performance by regressing excess REIT returns on the mimicking portfolio
returns and a constant. If the constant is indistinguishable from zero,
REIT expected returns are commensurate with their risk. If the intercept is
significantly positive, REITs are a superior investment; if the intercept is
significantly negative, REITs are poor performers. This yardstick of risk-
adjusted performance is analogous to the Jensen alpha in the single index
model.
B. Formation of Mimicking Portfolios
Five macroeconomic variables are pre-specified to be the factors that
affect returns in interval t. These are identical to the ones used by CRR:
(I) industrial production growth from t to t+l; (2) the change in expected
inflation from t-l to t: (3) unexpected inflation in t; (4) the difference
between the returns on low grade corporate bonds (below BAA) and long-term
Treasury bonds in period t (the change in the risk structure); and (5) the
difference between the returns between the long-term Treasury bonds and the
one month T-bill rate in period t (the change in the term structure). The
bill rate, inflation rate and Treasury bond return data are all from
Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1987). The manufacturing industrial production
index is from the Citibase Data Base, and the low grade corporate bond
return was supplied by Ibbotaon. Expected inflation ia estimated by an
univariate autoregressive procedure with aix lags.
The assets from which we form the mimicking portfolios are twenty
common stock portfolios ranked by market capitalization. These comprise all
stocks on the New York Stock Exchange and are formed in a way identical to
that used by CER. We use portfolios to mitigate the potentially large
estimation errors in computing asset return sensitivities to the
7macroeconomic variables when individual stocks are used. The use of size
ranking builds on the existing empirical studies that find that it yields
portfolios of diverse risk and return characteristics.
At the end of each year from 1972 to 1986, we rank all common stocks on
the New York Stock Exchange that have been listed for at least five years by
their capitalization and group them into twenty portfolios. Altogether,
there are 180 months (January 1973 to December 1987) of return data. We
first run time series regressions like equation (1) to obtain estimates of
the factor sensitivities 5 and the residual covariance matrix Z of the size-
ranked portfolios. We regress the excess returns (r - irf) of each of the
twenty size portfolios on the five macroeconomic variables and intercept in
the 1973-1987 period. Then we run the cross-sectional regressions to obtain
the returns on the mimicking portfolios. In each month of the 1973-1987
period, we regress the portfolio returns r cross-sectionally on the factor
sensitivities S by the generalized least squares method. The resultant
monthly regression coefficients on B are the returns on the mimicking
portfolios.
II. The Data
Our total REIT sample consists of 30 equity REIT5 traded on the NYSE,
AMEX and NSDAQ for various parts of the 1973-87 period. To be included in
our sample, we had to have share data over a variety of economic
environments (upswings and downturns, changing inflation) and the REIT had
to be invested predominately (over 75 percent) in (unforeclosed) real estate
properties during these periods.3 This effectively requires that the REIT
must have existed before 1982 and have lasted over four years. Because we
have excluded some short-lived REITs that subsequently declared bankruptcy,
some upward bias exists in our sample.
The 30 equity REITs, the period over which they are in our sample (pre-
1973 data were not used), the stock exchanges on which they were listed, and
whether they are highly (14 REITs) or moderately (16 REITs) levered are
shown in Table 1. Highly levered firms are those with at least 60 percent
book debt-to-asset ratios and 40 percent book net debt (debt less financial
assets) to asset ratios.4 The sample contains seven "1970s" REITs that are
not in our data base after 1982; seven "l980s" REITs that are not in our
data base prior to 1978, and sixteen 70s/80s REITs. At least 18 equity
REITs are in our sample throughout our estimation period, except the first
three months of 1973 when only 15 are in the sample.
Table 2 contains mesns and standard deviations for both the alternative
investments considered. The return series include indexes on our equally-
weighted portfolio of equity REITs and of the highly and moderately levered
subset portfolios, on both equally and value-weighted New York Stock
Exchange firms, and on one month Treasury bills. The return indexes are
expressed net of the Treasury bill yield. Excess returns on equity REITs,
especially highly levered REITs, were higher in the 1980s than in the 1970s
and with lower standard deviations. This was also true, but to a lesser
extent, for NYSE stocks generally.
For comparison, Figure 1 plots quarterly values of our equally-weighted
REIT series against the value-weighted equity REIT series published by the
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (1989, p. 55). While
the series are obviously correlated, our series is more volatile in the
l970s. Figure 2 plots quarterly returns on our two REIT subclasses. As
can be seen, returns on the more levered REITs are more volatile than those
on the less levered REITs, as one would expect.
9Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the macroeconomic
factors (correlations for the mimicking portfolios are given in parentheses)
are listed in Table 3. Unexpected inflation was generally positive in the
1970s, when actual inflation was accelerating, and negative in the l980s,
when actual inflation was decelerating. The mean values of industrial
production growth (nearly 3 percent per year), the change in expected
inflation (zero), and the risk structure variable are roughly the same in
the 1970s and l980s. In contrast, the term structure variable tends to be
negative in the l970s, when bond rates were generally rising, and positive
in the 1980s, when bond rates were generally falling.
The correlation matrix reveals two large correlations, especially in
the mimicking portfolios. First, the change in expected inflation and
unexpected inflation have a correlation coefficient of 0.53 (0.77 for the
mimicking portfolios). The positive correlation arises because unexpected
inflation leads to an upward revision in expected inflation. Second, the
risk and term structure variables are strongly negatively correlated (-0.65
for the factors and -0.76 for the mimicking portfolios. The negative
correlation should not be a surprise given that the expost return on
Treasury bonds is subtracted in the change-in-risk structure variable and is
added in the change-in-term structure variable.6
III. EmDirical Results
Our empirical results are divided into three parts. In the first, we
relate real estate returns net of the bill rate to the underlying
macroeconomic factors and the mimicking portfolios (we estimate equations 1'
and 6). Both a single factor model (returns on equally- or value-weighted
NYSE indexes) and the five factor model of CRR are tested. In the second
part, we test for leverage effects by explaining component equity REIT
10
indexes where the REITs have been subdivided by degree of leverage. In the
third part, we explore the relationship between equity REIT returns and
changes in the discount on an index of closed-end stock funds.
A. Factors and Returns
Table 4 contains results for the full 1973-87 sample (180 months) and
the 1973-79 and 1980-87 subsamples for some single-factor return
regressions. In all cases, the dependent variable is our equally-weighted
equity REIT return series less the one-month bill rate. The independent
variable (factor) is either the equally- or value-weighted NYSE index. As
can be seen, the fi estimates for both indexes are about 0.65 (slightly
greater in the 1970s and less in the 1980s), and there is some evidence of
excess returns. The a estimates are both statistically greater than zero in
the 1980s (t > 1.76), and that for the regression including the value-
weighted NYSE is statistically greater than zero for the entire period.7
With a monthly a of 0.005, the point estimate of the annual excess return is
a startling 6 percent. These regressions also indicate that our equally-
weighted equity REIT return series is more closely related (higher 2) to an
equally-weighted NYSE return index than to a value-weighted index, a not
surprising result. In what follows, both our equally-weighted REIT series
and the equally-weighted NYSE return series will be explained with the five
factors.
Table 5 reports regressions of monthly equally-weighted equity REIT and
NYSE indexes, respectively, over the one-month Treasury bill rate on a
constant term and the five macroeconomic factors for the 1973-87 period and
the 1973-79 and 1980-87 subperiods. Both indexes are significantly
positively related to the risk and term structure return variables in a
consistent way over both subperiods. The indexes are also systematically,
11
if not always statistically significantly, negatively related to unexpected
inflation. The greater precision in the risk and term structure estimates
may reflect the precision with which these variables are computed and lined
up time wise with the return indexes.
Three events are bad for stocks, including REIT5: unexpected
inflation, an increase in long-term interest rates, and an increase in low
grade rates relative to higher grade rates (an increase in bankruptcy risk).
These events occur at various, and variable, points in the business cycle.
What is important about our results is that equity REIT returns are
significantly less sensitive (only about 60 percent as much) to these bad
events as are stock returns generally. This is consistent with the
conventional wisdom that real estate is less risky than common stocks.
In all cases, for both the REIT and NYSE indexes, coefficients on the
risk and term return variables are within a standard error of each other,
which suggests that REIT and general stock market returns responded solely
to returns on low-grade bonds (the positive response to the high grade bond
return implicit in the term structure variable is cancelled by the negative
response implicit in the risk structure variable). NYSE returns move
slightly more (30 percent) than one-for-one with low-grade bond returns;
REIT returns move somewhat less (20 percent).
The impacts of changes in expected inflation and industrial production
are far less clear.8 Both REIT and NYSE indexes are significantly
positively related to changes in expected inflation in the l980s, but
unrelated (with negative coefficients) in the l970s. Both return series
appear to be positively related to industrial production, with most of the
impact for equity REITS coming from the 1970s. However, none of the
coefficients is statistically different from zero at the 95 percent
12
confidence level. Given the mixed results here, we would be inclined to
doubt the importance of these two factors.
The factors explain only half as much of the movement in equity REIT
returns as in the NYSE index (k2 of 0.17 versus 0.35). The greater
unexplained variation in REIT returns probably reflects two factors: the
greater unique risk in REITs (on average, there are about 20 REITs in the
sample versus over a 1000 NYSE fins) and variation in the implicit
discounts of the closed-end REITs.
Table 6 repeats the Table S regressions, but with the mimicking
portfolios replacing the factors. In this table, the NYSE return results
are reported first, and the residuals from these equations are included as a
regressor in the REIT equation. This inclusion does not affect the
estimated REIT factors loadings, but it does alter the constant ten and
improve the precision of the estimates.
Unexpected inflation and the risk and ten structure returns work as
before, although the risk structure coefficients are about a fifth less and
the ten structure coefficients a third less. Changes in expected inflation
and industrial production now have more consistent positive coefficients.
Most important are the constant tens, which can now be interpreted as
evidence of positive or negative risk-adjusted excess returns. As can be
seen, there is no evidence of excess returns on REITs, in contrast to the
single factor results reported in Table 4.
B. Returns on REITs with Varying Leverage
As we noted early, most of the equity REITs in our sample are
substantially levered (have book debt to asset ratios above 0.6). Why REITs
are levered is uncertain. The usual optimal leverage point is that at which
the tax advantage of debt equals agency and bankruptcy costs, but equity
13
REITs are not subject to taxation. For equity REITs, nontax advantages must
exist. What these advantages are could well affect how returns on
differentially levered firms respond to the macroeconomic factors.
Two possible advantages to long-term debt come to mind. First, if the
underlying properties have nonvsriable long-term leases, long-term debt will
act to balance the risk associated with such leases in a volatile world.
Second, if equity REIT investors sre largely institutions with legal
restrictions against leverage, the REITs can lever for the institutions.
The second advantage will simply increase risk for the usual reasons.9 In
this case we would expect returns on highly levered equity REITs to be more
sensitive to all macroeconomic factors than returns on less heavily levered
equity REITs.
The results where the REITs are partitioned into highly levered (14
REITs) and moderately levered (16 REITs) are given in Table 7. The highly
levered REITs are consistently more strongly related to the three factors
most important to REIT returns (the risk and term structure variables and
unexpected inflation) than are the moderately levered REITs. This suggests
that REITs are not using leverage to hedge fixed-rate long-term leases.
There is no evidence of excess returns for either REIT category in either
the 1970s or the 1980s.10
C. REITs and Closed-End Stock Funds
Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1989) have computed value-weighted discounts
on closed-end stock and bond funds and provided evidence that the discounts
are high when investors (especially in small stocks) are pessimistic and low
when investors are optimistic. It is at least plausible that the same
forces causing changes in the LST discounts cause changes in equity REIT
discounts and thus in equity REIT returns.
14
LST computed discounts for 20 stock funds and 30 bond funds. However,
discount data for only 7 to 18 stock funds existed in any given month.
Separate weighted-average discount series were obtained for all funds, just
stock funds, and just domestic stock funds (American South African and Japan
Fund were excluded).11 Results are reported below using each of these three
series.
In the absence of a closed-end fund discount, the value of an equity
REIT is simply its net asset value (NAy). With a discount, we write
REIT — NAV
The percentage change (%Es) in REIT value, which is also the REIT return
ignoring cash flow, is then
%AREIT = %NAV +
The definition of a REIT's discount is
DISC
REIT - NAV
1= NAV NAy -
Thus REIT/NAV — I + DISC, and its percentage change is simply
ADISC/(1+DISC). To determine whether the discount in our equally-weighted
equity REIT index is related to any of the LST value-weighted discounts, we
regress the our equity REIT return on this variable.
Our sample is restricted to the January 1973-December 1985 period
because LST did not compute their discounts after 1985. The results based
on their three discount measures are
REIT =
.0075 + .505 All Funds ft2 = .0410
(.0042) (.183)
15
—
.0075 + .528 Stock Funds ft2 = .0535
(.0042) (.169)
—
.0075 + .518 Domestic Stock Funds ft2 — .0557
(.0041) (.163)
As can be seen, the equity REIT discount seems to move by about one-half the
movement in any of the LST discounts.
To determine whether the LST discount is an independent force or is
simply picking up the impact of macroeconomic factors, we reestimated the
first equation in Table S over the 1973-85 period with the domestic stock
fund discount variable. The latter has a coefficient of 0.404 with a t-
ratio of 2.6, while the coefficients on the macro factors are similar to
those in Table S. That is, the discount does hsve an independent effect.
REIT returns are also regressed on the discount variable and the
mimicking portfolios. Here the discount's coefficient is only 0.10 with s
t-ratio of 0.8. That is, the discount is dominated by the mimicking
portfolios but not by the macrofactors themselves: This is because the
mimicking portfolios are size ranked and, as Lee, Shleifer and Thaler have
shown, the discount is correlated with returns on size-ranked portfolios.
Last, we regressed our highly-levered and moderately-levered REIT
indexes on the percentage change in the LST closed-end stock fund discount.
The results sre
REIT, HL — .0085 + .777 Stock Funds ft2 — .0689
(.0054) (.220)
REIT, ML — .0069 + .370 Stock Funds ft2 — .0308
(.0037) (.150)
As expected discounts on more highly levered REITs are more sensitive to the
LST closed-end stock fund discount than are discounts on less highly levered
REITs.
16
IV. Conclusion
Early research on real estate returns concluded that real estate both
earned substantial risk-adjusted excess returns and served as a good hedge
against inflation. This research employed appraisal-based real estate
return data. When transactions-based equity REIT returns (an equally-
weighted series for 18 to 23 REITs) are utilized in a single factor CAPM
model, excess returns still seen to exist, at least in the 1980s. However,
when a five factor model is used, the evidence of excess returns disappears.
Moreover, real estate is not seen to be a hedge against inflation.
The five factors employed are changes in expected inflation and
industrial production, the risk and term structure return variables, and
unexpected inflation. The latter three factors consistently affect both
real estate and general stock market returns in the 1970s and 1980s.
Returns are positively related to the risk and tern structure returns and
negatively related to unexpected inflation. Moreover, real estate returns
are affected only about 60 percent as much as NYSE returns generally. That
is, real estate is less risky than common stocks. Changes in expected
inflation and industrial production do not have systematic impacts, although
that of industrial production does seem to be positive.
We also divide our equity REITs into highly and moderately levered
subgroups and compute equally-weighted return series. Regressions of these
series on the five macroeconomic factors indicate that the more levered
REITs are consistently more strongly related to the factors than are the
less levered REITs. Again, no evidence of excess returns appears.
Last, we relate equity REIT returns to the percentage change in the
discount on closed-end stock funds. A statistically significant relation is
estimated, with the implied closed-end fund discount on equity REITs
changing by about half of any change in the closed-end stock fund discount.
Regressions of REIT returns on the discount variable and the macroeconomic
17
factors suggest that the discount variable is not simply proxying for the
macroeconomic factors but has an independent influence.
We see three useful directions in which to extend this research. First,
the effect of leverage should be studied in more depth. Varying leverage of
REITs over time and the proportion of assets with long-term fixed rate
leases (nonresidential properties versus residential properties) should be
accounted for in this extension. Second, the same model can be applied to
various classes of mortgage REITs. These REITs vary widely in risk with
construction-loan REITs probably being the riskiest and GNMA REITs being the
least. Third, the performance of equity REITs could usefully be compared
more closely with that of closed-end mutual funds, as was done in the
original equity REIT study (Smith and Shulman, 1976).
18
Footnotes
1Geltner (1989) contends that real estate does not provide excess returns
when the smoothed nature of appraisal returns is taken into account.
2chamberlain (1983) and others provide conditions under which (2) holds.
3Seven of the 16 REITs classified by Titman and Warga (1987) as equity REITs
were mortgage REITs that had foreclosed on many loans. An eighth was
Pittsburg and West Virginia Railroad. While technically an equity REIT, its
single asset is a 99 year fixed-rate lease. Thus we have excluded it from
our sample. Because our definition of equity REITs differs so markedly, we
do not compare our results with those of Titman and Warga.
4The book values refer to data around 1980-82, the middle of our estimation
period.
5Mesns (and standard deviations) for their quarterly data are 3.66 (7.88)
for 1973-87, 3.04 (9.03) for 1973-79, and 4.21 (6.83) for 1980-87. The same
data for our equally-weighted series are 4.45 (9.77) for 1973-87, 3.73
(12.50) for 1973-79, and 5.10 (6.68) for 1980-87.
6This reasoning is a bit too mechanistic. If changes in new-issue Treasury
coupon rates affected returns on Treasuries and junk bonds equally, the
changes in the risk and term structure variables would not be correlated.
Junk bond returns would be affected differentially (less) to the extent that
they have a shorter duration and are callable.
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7These results are consistent with Liu, Hartzell, Grissom and Greig (1990)
who find that six of their 18 equity REITs earned excess returns in the
1978-86 period.
8Note that the expected inflation variable employed is the change in
expected inflation, not the level. Because the level is known at the
beginning of the month, it is not an economic surprise. The studies
referred to in our opening paragraph generally related real estate returns
to the level of expected inflation, not the change.
9Some of the debt could be below-market mortgages assumed when properties
were purchased. It would seem unlikely that most of the debt arises in this
way, and if the debt were really onerous except for its low interest rate,
then the REIT would likely induce the lender to accept retirement of the
debt at below par. In any event, such debt increases the risk of equity
returns.
'°When the moderately leveraged REITs are further subdivided into medium and
lightly leveraged (8 each), leaving as few as five REITs in the sample at
times, there is some evidence of excess returns for the medium group in the
l980s.
11We thank Charles Lee for supplying us with the data.
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Table 1:
Equity REITs Used to Compute Equally-Weighted Return Indexes
Name Period Exchanzes Leveraze
American Equity Investment TR. 6/74-8/84 NASDAQ ML
S.F. Saul 1/78-12/87 NYSE ML
California Jockey Club 12/72-12/83 AMEX, NASDAQ ML
Continental Illinois Prop. 10/73-6/79 NYSE ML
Eastgroup Prop. 2/73-12/87 AMEX ML
Federal Realty Investment Tr. 7/75-12/87 NYSE, AMEX ML
First Fidelity Investment Tr. 1/73-10/78 NASDAQ ML
Florida Gulf Realty Tr. 6/73-11/85 NASDAQ ML
General Growth Prop. 4/73-12/84 NYSE, NASDAQ HL
General Real Estate Shares 1/73-12/87 NASDAQ ML
Gould Investment Trust 5/73-9/82 AMEX ML
Greater Washington mv. Corp. 7/69-5/74,
12/80-12/87 NYSE, NASDAQ ML
MMG/Courtland Prop 1/82-12/87 AMEX ML
Mollywood Pk. Realty Group 1/73-12/87 NASDAQ ML
MRE Prop. 6/70-12/87 NYSE ML
International Inc. Prop. Inc. 1/80-12/87 NASDAQ, AMEX ML
IRT Prop. Co. 11/71-12/87 AMEX, NYSE ML
Kenilworth Realty Tr. 1/74-7/81 NYSE ML
Miller Menry 1/73-11/82 NASDAQ ML
Property Capital 1/73-12/87 AMEX ML
Penn. REIT 7/70-12/87 AMEX ML
Property Trust of America 1/73-12/87 NASDAQ ML
REIT America 5/71-1/84 AMEX ML
Santa Anita Realty Center 6/81-12/87 NYSE ML
Storage Equities, Inc. 10/82-12/87 NASDAQ, NYSE ML
Summit Properties 1/73-5/79 NASDAQ ML
USP REIT 5/78-12/87 NASDAQ ML
United Domain Pty Trust 3/80-12/87 NASDAQ HL
Virginia REIT 1/73-2/81 NASDAQ ML
Washington REIT 6/71-12/87 AMEX ML
Leverage: ML — highly levered (14)
ML — moderately levered (16)
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Table 2: Meana and Standard Deviations of Return Series
1973-87 1973-79 1980-87
Equally-Weighted
EREIT - TRill
Mean .0877 .0748 .0990
Std. Dev. .627 .782 .454
t-stat 1.58 0.64 1.99
for Mean — 0
Highly-Levered
REIT-TRill
Mean .0978 .0729 .1197
Std. Dev. .812 1.037 .550
t-stat 1.62 0.64 2.13
Moderately -Levered
REIT-TBi11
Mean 0802 .0732 .0864
Std. Dev. .569 .679 .454
t-atat 1.89 0.99 1.86
Equally-Weighted
NYSE - TRill
Mean .0761 .0645 .0863
Std. Dev. .742 .830 .660
t-stat 1.38 0.71 1.28
Value -Weighted
NYSE - TRill
Mean .0319 - .0130 .0711
Std. Dev. .607 .599 .613
t-stat 0.71 -0.20 1.14
Treasury Bills
Mean .0789 .0670 .0895
Std. Dev. .0275 .0186 .0299
t-stat 38.35 33.02 29.21
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Table 4:
Equity REIT Returns less the Treasury Bill Rate in a Single Factor Model
Period Constant Equally-Weighted Value-Weighted 2 t-statistic
NYSE NYSE
1973-87 .0031 .659 .606 1.27
(.0025) (.040)
1973-87 .0056 .635 .373 1.82*
(.0031) (.061)
1973-79 .0023 .734 .508 0.51
(.0045) (.065)
1973-79 .0070 .750 .322 1.20
(.0059) (.118)
1980-87 .0043 .556 .650 1.85*
(.0023) (.042)
1980-87 .0050 .541 .531 1.89*
(.0027) (.0525
Standard errors of regression coefficients are in parentheses.
*Indicates significant t ratio at 5 percent level for one-tailed test.
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